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FEATURES 
 
Autonomous Weapon Systems and International 
Humanitarian Law: A Reply to the Critics 
__________________________ 
Michael N. Schmitt* 
 
“A sword is never a killer, it is a tool in the killer’s hands.” 
Seneca1 
 
Introduction 
 
In November 2012, Human Rights Watch, in collaboration with the 
International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School, released Losing 
Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots.2 Human Rights Watch is among the 
most sophisticated of human rights organizations working in the field of 
international humanitarian law. Its reports are deservedly influential and 
have often helped shape application of the law during armed conflict. 
Although this author and the organization have occasionally crossed 
swords,3 we generally find common ground on key issues. This time, we 
have not. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Chairman and Professor, International Law Department, United States Naval War 
College; Honorary Professor of International Humanitarian Law, Durham University Law 
School (UK). The views expressed in this Article are those of the author alone and should 
not be understood as necessarily representing those of the U.S. Department of Defense or 
any other government entity. 
1 Letters to Lucilius, 1st c., cited in WAR AND CONFLICT QUOTES 158 (Michael C. Thomsett 
& Jean F. Thomsett eds., 1997) 
2 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS, 
Nov. 2012, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112ForUpload_0_0.pdf 
[hereinafter LOSING HUMANITY]. 
3See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, The Conduct of Hostilities During Operational Iraqi Freedom: An 
International Humanitarian Law Assessment, 6 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 73 (2003): Dinah 
Pokempner, Marc Garlasco & Bonnie Docherty, Off Target on the Iraq Campaign: A Response to 
Professor Schmitt, 6 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 111 (2003). 
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“Robots” is a colloquial rendering for autonomous weapon systems. 
Human Rights Watch’s position on them is forceful and unambiguous: 
“[F]ully autonomous weapons would not only be unable to meet legal 
standards but would also undermine essential non-safeguards for civilians.”4 
Therefore, they “should be banned and . . . governments should urgently 
pursue that end.”5 In fact, if the systems cannot meet the legal standards 
cited by Human Rights Watch, then they are already unlawful as such under 
customary international law irrespective of any policy or treaty law ban on 
them.6  
 
Unfortunately, Losing Humanity obfuscates the on-going legal debate 
over autonomous weapon systems. A principal flaw in the analysis is a 
blurring of the distinction between international humanitarian law’s 
prohibitions on weapons per se and those on the unlawful use of otherwise 
lawful weapons.7 Only the former render a weapon illegal as such. To 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 1–2. On the issue of the legality of autonomous 
weapon systems, see Jeffrey S. Thurnher, No One at the Controls: Legal Implications of Fully 
Autonomous Targeting 77, JOINT FORCE Q., Oct. 2012;Kenneth Anderson & Matthew 
Waxman, Law and Ethics for Robot Soldiers, POL’Y REV. 35, Dec. 2012; Markus Wagner, 
Taking Humans Out of the Loop: Implications for International Humanitarian Law, 21 J. L. INFO. & 
SCI. 155, 155 (2011). 
5 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 2. 
6 The author referred to the following non-binding compilations of customary international 
humanitarian law rules to draw conclusions as to customary status of norms referenced in 
this article: INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS [ICRC], CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck 
eds., 2005) [hereinafter CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY]; 
MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, CHARLES H.B. GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE MANUAL 
ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY (2006); 
HARVARD PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, MANUAL 
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE, WITH 
COMMENTARY (2010); MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter 
TALLINN MANUAL]. Although not compilations of customary international law, scholars 
and practitioners also often look to the Rome Statute and the U.S. Commander’s 
Handbook as strong indications of a norm’s customary status, the latter in light of the 
United States’ Additional Protocol I non-Party status. Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; U.S. NAVY/U.S. 
MARINE CORPS/U.S. COAST GUARD, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
NAVAL OPERATIONS, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDT PUBP5800.7A (2007) 
[hereinafter COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK]. 
7 As Yoram Dinstein notes, “The fact that certain weapons are used indiscriminately in a 
particular military engagement does not stain the weapons themselves with an indelible 
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illustrate, a rifle is lawful, but may be used unlawfully, as in shooting a 
civilian. By contrast, under customary international law, biological weapons 
are unlawful per se; this is so even if they are used against lawful targets, such 
as the enemy’s armed forces. The practice of inappropriately conflating 
these two different strands of international humanitarian law has plagued 
debates over other weapon systems, most notably unmanned combat aerial 
systems such as the armed Predator. In addition, some of the report’s legal 
analysis fails to take account of likely developments in autonomous weapon 
systems technology or is based on unfounded assumptions as to the nature 
of the systems. Simply put, much of Losing Humanity is either counter-factual 
or counter-normative. 
 
This Article is designed to infuse granularity and precision into the 
legal debates surrounding such weapon systems and their use in the future 
“battlespace.” It suggests that whereas some conceivable autonomous 
weapon systems might be prohibited as a matter of law, the use of others 
will be unlawful only when employed in a manner that runs contrary to 
international humanitarian law’s prescriptive norms. This Article concludes 
that Losing Humanity’s recommendation to ban the systems is insupportable 
as a matter of law, policy, and operational good sense. Human Rights 
Watch’s analysis sells international humanitarian law short by failing to 
appreciate how the law tackles the very issues about which the organization 
expresses concern. Perhaps the most glaring weakness in the 
recommendation is the extent to which it is premature. No such weapons 
have even left the drawing board. To ban autonomous weapon systems 
altogether based on speculation as to their future form is to forfeit any 
potential uses of them that might minimize harm to civilians and civilian 
objects when compared to other systems in military arsenals. 
 
I. Autonomous Weapon Systems 
 
Before turning to the law, it is necessary to frame the issue 
definitionally. A weapon system consists of a weapon and the items 
associated with its employment.8 An example is the Predator unmanned 
aerial combat system armed with a weapon such as a Hellfire missile. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
imprint of illegality, since in other operations the same weapons may be employed within 
the framework of [international humanitarian law].” YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT 
OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 62 (2d ed., 
2010).  
8 In this Article, the term “weapon system” is used as shorthand to refer to both a weapon 
and the complete weapon system. 
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Department of Defense has recently defined an autonomous weapon system 
as: 
 
a weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage 
targets without further intervention by a human operator. 
This includes human-supervised autonomous weapon 
systems that are designed to allow human operators to 
override operation of the weapon system, but can select and 
engage targets without further human input after activation.9  
 
The crux of full autonomy is a capability to identify, target, and 
attack a person or object without human interface. Although a human 
operator may retain the ability to take control of the system, it can operate 
without any control being exercised. Of course, a fully autonomous system 
is never completely human-free. Either the system designer or an operator 
would at least have to program the system to function pursuant to specified 
parameters.  
 
U.S. forces have operated two human-supervised autonomous 
systems for many years⎯the Aegis at sea and the Patriot on land⎯both 
designed to defend against short notice missile attacks.10 Another human-
supervised autonomous weapon system, Israel’s Iron Dome, is presently 
receiving a great deal of attention as it very effectively destroys incoming 
rockets.11 However, the United States is currently not fielding any fully 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 DEP’T OF DEF.,  DIRECTIVE 3000.09, AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS 13–14 (Nov. 2, 
2012) [hereinafter DoD DIRECTIVE 3000.09]. Human Rights Watch distinguishes three 
categories of systems. A “human in the loop” system requires a human to direct the system 
to select a target and attack it. The Department of Defense labels these “semi-autonomous 
systems.”  A “human on the loop” weapon is one in which the system selects targets and 
attacks them, albeit with human operator oversight. The Department of Defense term is 
“human-supervised autonomous system.”  Finally, Human Rights Watch calls a system that 
can attack without any human interface a “human out of the loop weapon.” The 
Department of Defense moniker is “fully autonomous weapon system.” LOSING 
HUMANITY,  supra note 2, at 2. 
10 Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Patriot TMD, 
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/patriot.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2012); 
Lockheed Martin, Aegis Combat System, 
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/aegis.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2012).  
11 Iron Dome can operate automatically using programmed parameters, but the system also 
allows for human operator intervention. Inbal Orpaz, How does Iron Dome Operate?, 
HAARETZ, (Nov. 19, 2012),  http://www.haaretz.com/news/features/how-does-the-iron-
dome-work.premium-1.478988; RAFAEL, IRON DOME, available at 
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autonomous weapon systems.12 Nor are there any “plans to develop lethal 
autonomous weapon systems other than human-supervised systems for the 
purposes of local defense of manned vehicles or installations.”13 That said, 
Human Rights Watch is correct in noting that this fact does “not preclude a 
change in that policy as the capacity for autonomy evolves.”14 At some point 
in the future, such systems will find their way into the battlespace. 
 
Fully autonomous weapon systems must be distinguished from those 
that are semi-autonomous, which are commonplace in contemporary 
warfare.15 The latter engage specific targets or categories of targets that a 
human operator selects. For instance, a “fire and forget” missile on an 
aircraft locks onto a target identified by the pilot and then attacks it without 
human involvement. Losing Humanity does not address semi-autonomous 
systems⎯appropriately so since the systems differ qualitatively from those 
that are fully autonomous. Nor does the report examine what it calls 
“automatic weapons defense systems.”16 These systems respond 
automatically (or near automatically) when they detect incoming threats. An 
example is the “close-in weapon system” (CIWS or “Sea Whiz”).17 Used for 
point-defense of warships against incoming missiles, the Sea Whiz can be 
programmed to detect inbound missiles based on parameters that include 
speed and altitude, and can automatically engage them. 
 
Before turning to the legal issues surrounding autonomous weapon 
systems, it is necessary to debunk a number of myths about the systems that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.rafael.co.il/marketing/SIP_STORAGE/FILES/6/946.pdf (last visited Feb. 
3, 2012). 
12 DEP’T OF DEF., DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.09: AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS: 
RESPONSE-TO-QUERY TALKING POINTS 1 (date unknown) (on file with author). The 
United States fields autonomous weapon systems that use nonlethal and non-kinetic force. 
An example is the Miniature Air Launched Decoy Jammer (MALD-J), which is launched 
from an aircraft and flies a preprogrammed mission while jamming enemy radar and 
serving as a decoy. Id. at 2.  
13 Id. at 3. 
14 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 8. 
15 The weapons are also known as “launch and leave” weapons. Examples include the 
AGM-130 and AGM-65 missiles used for attacking ground targets. See descriptions of 
these and other such systems at U.S. AIR FORCE, Factsheets (Weapons), 
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/index.asp (last visited Feb. 3, 2012). 
16 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 9. 
17 U.S. Navy, MK-15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS), 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2100&tid=487&ct=2 (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2012). 
2013 / Autonomous Weapon Systems and IHL: A Reply to the Critics 6	  
are clouding public debate. First, the idea of “robot wars” is pure science 
fiction. As noted by a Department of Defense Task Force, “the true value of 
these systems is not to provide a direct human replacement, but rather to 
extend and complement human capability by providing potentially 
unlimited persistent capabilities, reducing human exposure to life-
threatening tasks, and, with proper design, reducing the high cognitive load 
currently placed on operators/supervisors.”18 Autonomous weapon systems 
will be integrated into human warfare, but are highly unlikely to replace it.  
 
Second, neither the United States nor any other country is 
contemplating the development of any systems that would simply hunt 
down and kill or destroy enemy personnel and objects without restrictive 
engagement parameters, such as area of operation or nature of the target. 
Moreover, the Defense Science Board points out that:  
 
[A]ll autonomous systems are supervised by human operators 
at some level, and autonomous systems’ software embodies 
the designed limits on the actions and decisions delegated to 
the computer. Instead of viewing autonomy as an intrinsic 
property of an unmanned vehicle in isolation, the design and 
operation of autonomous systems needs to be considered in 
terms of human–system collaboration.19  
 
As presently envisaged, autonomous weapon systems will only attack targets 
meeting predetermined criteria and will function within an area of 
operations set by human operators.  
 
The U.S. Department of Defense is exceptionally sensitive to the 
human interface issue. It has recently promulgated policy guidance that 
requires the Secretaries of the military departments, the Commander of 
U.S. Special Operations Command, and certain other high level officials to: 
 
[d]esign human-machine interfaces for autonomous and 
semi-autonomous weapon systems to be readily 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Memorandum in 
DEP’T OF DEF., DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD, THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN DOD SYSTEMS 
(July 2012), http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/AutonomyReport.pdf.  
19 Id. at 1–2. DoD DIRECTIVE  3000.09, supra note 9, ¶ 4a, similarly provides that 
“[a]utonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow 
commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use 
of force.”  
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understandable to trained operators, provide traceable 
feedback on system status, and provide clear procedures for 
trained operators to activate and deactivate system functions 
. . . ; [c]ertify that operators of autonomous and semi-
autonomous weapon systems have been trained in system 
capabilities, doctrine, and [tactics, techniques, and 
procedures] in order to exercise appropriate levels of human 
judgment in the use of force and employ systems with 
appropriate care and in accordance with the law of war, 
applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and 
applicable ROE . . . ; [and e]stablish and periodically review 
training, and [tactics, techniques, and procedures], and 
doctrine for autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon 
systems to ensure operators and commanders understand the 
functioning, capabilities, and limitations of a system’s 
autonomy in realistic operational conditions, including as a 
result of possible adversary actions.20  
 
Finally, robots will not “go rogue.” While autonomous and semi-
autonomous weapon systems will be susceptible to malfunction, that is also 
the case with weapon systems ranging from catapults to computer attack 
systems. Like a missile that “goes ballistic” (loses guidance), future 
autonomous systems could fall out of parameters. But the prospect of them 
“taking on a life of their own” is an invention of Hollywood.  
 
The one real risk is tampering by the enemy or non-State actors 
such as hackers. As an example, the enemy might be able to use cyber 
means to take control of an autonomous weapon system and direct it against 
friendly forces or a civilian population. Those developing the systems are 
acutely aware of such risk. U.S. policy on the matter is that, “[c]onsistent 
with the potential consequences of an unintended engagement or loss of 
control of the system to unauthorized parties, physical hardware and 
software will be designed with appropriate: (a) [s]afeties, anti-tamper 
mechanisms, and information assurance [and] (b) [h]uman machine 
interface.”21 
  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Id., encl. 4, ¶ 8. 
21 Id., ¶ 4a(2). 
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II. Unlawful Weapon Systems 
 
Losing Humanity concludes that “[a]n initial evaluation of fully 
autonomous weapons shows . . . such robots would appear to be incapable 
of abiding by key principles of international humanitarian law. They would 
be unable to follow the rules of distinction, proportionality, and military 
necessity and might contravene the Martens Clause.”22 While it is true that 
some autonomous weapon systems might violate international humanitarian 
law norms, it is categorically not the case that all such systems will do so. 
Instead, and as with most other weapon systems, their lawfulness as such, as 
well as the lawfulness of their use, must be judged on a case-by-case basis. 
To assert, as Human Rights Watch does, that “[f]ull autonomy would strip 
civilians of protections from the effects of war that are guaranteed under the 
law” is to melodramatically oversimplify international humanitarian law, 
while failing to accord it the respect it is due. 
 
The international humanitarian law governing weaponry proceeds 
along two tracks. One focuses on the legality of the weapon system itself. 
The legal reviews discussed below respond to this issue. A separate and 
distinct family of prohibitions (labelled “conduct of hostilities” rules) applies 
to a weapon system’s use irrespective of whether or not the weapon system 
is lawful per se. 
 
Among the earliest prohibitions with respect to the legality of 
weapons per se is the ban on means or methods of warfare that are of a 
nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.23 It first 
appeared in the regulations annexed to the 1899 Hague Convention II and 
its 1907 counterpart.24 Article 35(2) of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions affirms the prohibition and irrefutably reflects 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 30. 
23 See generally DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 63–67; WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, WEAPONS AND 
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, ch. 5 (2009). 
24 Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, pmbl., July 29, 
1899, 32 Stat. 1803 [hereinafter 1899 Hague II]; Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land, pmbl., Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter 1907 Hague 
IV]. The 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration presaged the prohibition with its condemnation 
of “the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or 
render their death inevitable.” Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of 
Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, pmbl., Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, 18 
Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 474 [hereinafter St. Petersburg Declaration].. 
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customary international law.25 Therefore, the norm binds even States that 
are not Party to the Protocol, such as the United States. Substantively, it 
outlaws those means and methods of warfare that unnecessarily aggravate 
the suffering of combatants, that is, which cause suffering serving no military 
purpose. In that it is otherwise unlawful to attack civilians, this norm applies 
only to suffering or injury experienced by combatants.26  
 
Losing Humanity does not mention the prohibition. Perhaps this is 
because autonomy is unlikely to present unnecessary suffering and 
superfluous injury issues since the rule addresses a weapon system’s effect on 
the targeted individual, not the manner of engagement (autonomous). 
Nevertheless, an autonomous system could be used as a platform for a 
weapon that would violate the prohibition, such as a bomb containing 
fragments that are designed to be difficult to locate during the treatment of 
wounded combatants.27 The combination of the platform and the weapon 
would render the autonomous weapon system unlawful per se. But this 
possibility is not a valid basis for imposing an across-the-board preemptive 
ban on the systems. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 35(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY, supra note 6, rule 70; Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8), ¶ 78 [hereinafter Nuclear 
Weapons]. See also Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 8(2)(b)(xx); COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, 
supra note 6, ¶ 9.1.1. On Article 35(2), see also ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 (Yves 
Sandoz et al. eds., 1987), ¶¶ 1410–1439 [hereinafter ICRC COMMENARY]; MICHAEL 
BOTHE, KARL JOSEF PARTSCH & WALDEMAR A. SOLF, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF 
ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO 
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949 at 195–198 (1982).  
26 For the purposes of this article, the term combatants includes civilians who are directly 
participating in the hostilities since they are subject to attack for such time as they so 
participate. Additional Protocol I, supra note 25, art. 51(3). On the subject of targetability 
and direct participation, see ICRC, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF 
DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
(Nils Melzer ed., 2009); Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 5 (2010). 
27 Protocol (to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects) on Non-detectable Fragments, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168; 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY, supra note 6, rule 79. 
2013 / Autonomous Weapon Systems and IHL: A Reply to the Critics 10	  
International humanitarian law also prohibits weapon systems that 
cannot be directed at a specific military objective.28 These weapons are 
unlawful per se in that they are of a nature to strike combatants, military 
objectives, civilians, and civilian objects without distinction. The principle of 
distinction is a norm of customary international law,29 and the companion 
treaty prohibition appears in Article 51(4)(b) of Additional Protocol I.30  
 
The prohibition on weapon systems that are indiscriminate because 
they cannot be aimed at a lawful target is often confused with the ban on 
use of discriminate weapons in an indiscriminate fashion. The classic case is 
that of the SCUD missiles launched by Iraq during the 1990-91 Gulf War. 
While it is true that the missiles were inaccurate, they were not unlawful per 
se because situations existed in which they could be employed 
discriminately. In particular, the missiles were capable of use against troops 
in open areas such as the desert, and they actually struck very large military 
installations without seriously endangering the civilian population.31 
However, when launched in the direction of cities, as repeatedly occurred 
during the conflict, their use was undeniably unlawful. Even though the cities 
contained military objectives, the missiles were insufficiently accurate to 
reliably strike any of them. 
 
The SCUD example has particular resonance with respect to 
autonomous weapon systems. A misperception exists that without a “man in 
the loop” there is a high risk of misidentifying civilians or civilian objects as 
lawful military objectives that either may be directly attacked or that do not 
have to be considered when assessing whether an attack on a military 
objective will comply with the rule of proportionality (discussed below). In 
fact, Human Rights Watch categorically claims that “[f]ully autonomous 
weapons would not have the ability to sense or interpret the difference 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See generally Boothby, supra note 23, ch. 6. 
29 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY, supra note 6, rules 12 & 7. 
See also Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 8(2)(b)(xx); COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 
6, ¶¶ 5.3.2 & 9.1.2. Application of the prohibition evolves over time in relation to the 
development of increasingly accurate weapon systems. To illustrate, many of the gravity 
bombs designed for release from high altitudes that were dropped during World War II 
would today be characterized as indiscriminate.  
30 ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 25, ¶¶ 1956–1960.  
31 DEP’T OF DEF., CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 
166–168, 621–622 (1992); WILLIAM ROSENAU, SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND 
ELUSIVE ENEMY GROUND TARGETS, ch. 3 (2001) (entitled “Coalition SCUD- Hunting in 
Iraq 1991”).  
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between soldiers and civilians, especially in contemporary combat 
environments.”32 
 
What Human Rights Watch appears to have missed is that even an 
autonomous weapon system that is completely incapable of distinguishing a 
civilian from a combatant or a military objective from a civilian object can 
be lawful per se. Not every battlespace contains civilians or civilian objects. 
When they do not, a system devoid of any capacity to distinguish protected 
persons and objects from lawful military targets can be used without 
endangering the former. Typical examples would include the employment 
of such systems for an attack on a tank formation in a remote area of the 
desert or from warships in areas of the high seas far from maritime 
navigation routes. The inability of the weapon systems to distinguish bears 
on the legality of their use in particular circumstances (such as along a 
roadway on which military and civilian traffic travels), but not their 
lawfulness per se.  
 
Human Rights Watch’s apprehension is also counterfactual. Military 
technology has advanced well beyond simply being able to spot an 
individual or object. Modern sensors can, inter alia, assess the shape and size 
of objects, determine their speed, identify the type of propulsion being used, 
determine the material of which they are made, listen to the object and its 
environs, and intercept associated communications or other electronic 
emissions. They can also gather additional data on other objects or 
individuals in the area and, depending on the platform with which they are 
affiliated, monitor a potential target for extended periods in order to gather 
information that will enhance the reliability of identification and permit 
target engagement when the target is relatively isolated. Even software for 
autonomous weapon systems that enables visual identification of individuals, 
thereby enabling precision during autonomous “personality strikes” against 
specified persons, is likely to be developed. These and related technological 
capabilities auger against characterization of autonomous weapon systems 
as unlawful per se solely based on their autonomous nature.33  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 30. 
33 In particular, they reveal Human Rights Watch’s concerns that combatants sometimes 
fail to “wear uniforms or insignia” or are identifiable only through their “direct 
participation in hostilities” as exaggerated and simplistic (at least with regard to the issue of 
distinction by the systems). Id. 
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The organization actually seems to ask more of autonomous weapon 
systems than of human-operated systems. For example, Human Rights 
Watch points to the possibility that an autonomous weapon system might be 
deceived through the concealment of weapons or exploitation of the 
system’s sensor limitations.34 Yet, asymmetrically disadvantaged enemies 
have been feigning civilian or other protected status to avoid being engaged 
by human-operated weapon systems for decades (even centuries).35 The fact 
that the techniques sometimes prove successful has never merited classifying 
those systems as indiscriminate per se. In fact, it would be counter-productive 
to take such an approach because it would incentivize the enemy’s use of the 
tactic in order to keep weapon systems off the battlefield. 
 
Human Rights Watch also observes that “fully autonomous weapons 
would not possess human qualities necessary to assess an individual’s 
intentions.”36 While it is true that human perception of human activity can 
enhance identification in some circumstances, human-operated systems 
already frequently engage targets without the benefit of the emotional 
sensitivity cited by the organization. For example, human-operated “beyond 
visual range” attacks are commonplace in modern warfare; no serious 
charge has been levelled that the weapon systems that conduct them are 
unlawful per se.37 
 
 In fact, human judgment can prove less reliable then technical 
indicators in the heat of battle. For instance, during the 1994 friendly fire 
shootdown of two U.S. Army Blackhawks in the no-fly zone over northern 
Iraq, the U.S. Air Force F-15's involved made a close visual pass of the 
targets before engaging them.38 Pilot error (and human error aboard the 
AWACs monitoring the situation) contributed to their misidentification as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Id. at 31. 
35 See generally Michael N. Schmitt, Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian Law, 62 
AIR FORCE L. REV. 1, 15–16 (2008). Human Rights Watch might also have cited the use of 
human shields, a practice that would also complicate autonomous weapon system targeting. 
See generally Michael N. Schmitt, Human Shields and International Humanitarian Law, 47 COLUM. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 292 (2009). 
36 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 31. 
37 As an example, the U.S. Navy’s AIM-54 air-to-air Phoenix missile has a range in excess 
of 100 nautical miles. U.S. Navy, AIM-54 Phoenix Missile, 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2200&tid=700&ct=2 (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2012). 
38 Aircraft Accident Investigation Board Report, U.S. Army UH-60 Blackhawk Helicopters 87-
26000 and 88-26060, vol. 1 (Executive Summary) 3 (May 27, 1994), available at 
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/PersianGulfWar/973-1.pdf. 
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Iraqi military helicopters. Similarly, in 1988 the USS Vincennes engaged an 
Iranian airliner that it mistakenly believed was conducting an attack on the 
ship. The warship’s computers accurately indicated that the aircraft was 
ascending. Nevertheless, human error led the crew to believe it was 
descending in an attack profile and, in order to defend the ship, they shot 
down the aircraft.39 Such tragedies demonstrate that a man in the loop is 
not a panacea during situations in which it may be difficult to distinguish 
civilians and civilian objects from combatants and military objectives. Those 
who believe otherwise have not experienced the fog of war.  
 
Losing Humanity also highlights the unique emotional character of 
human beings. It suggests “robots would not be restrained by human 
emotions and the capacity for compassion, which can provide an important 
check on the killing of civilians.” The report concludes that “[e]motionless 
robots could, therefore, serve as tools of repressive dictators seeking to crack 
down on their own people without fear their troops would turn on them.”40 
While it is certainly correct that emotions can restrain humans, it is equally 
true that emotions can unleash the basest of instincts. From Rwanda and 
the Balkans to Darfur and Afghanistan, history is replete with tragic 
examples of unchecked emotions leading to horrendous suffering. Reliance 
on this factor by Human Rights Watch is empirically suspect. 
 
An autonomous weapon system only violates the prohibition against 
weapons incapable of being directed at a lawful target if there are no 
circumstances, given its intended use, in which it can be used discriminately. 
Consider an autonomous anti-personnel weapon system designed for 
employment in urban areas. Because it is contemplated for use where 
civilians and combatants are regularly co-located, the system must have 
sufficient sensor and artificial intelligence capability to distinguish them; 
otherwise, it qualifies as indiscriminate per se. An autonomous weapon 
system unable to reliably distinguish between civilians and combatants but 
planned for use where civilians are not present would still have to be 
capable of geographical restriction (either based on system constraints such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Downing of Iran Air Flight 
655 on 3 July 1988, Aug. 19, 1988, at 37, 42–45 available at 
http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/ir655-dod-report.html. The report concluded 
that “[s]tress, task fixation, and unconscious distortion of data may have played a major 
role in this incident.” Id. at 45. It also noted that “scenario fulfillment,” that is, the 
distortion of “dataflow in an unconscious attempt to make available evidence fit a 
preconceived scenario.” Id. 
40 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 4. 
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as maximum range or on human operator pre-programming). This would 
be needed to prevent it from passing into areas where civilians are located. 
Systems can be limited temporally to achieve the same end.41 
 
A second form of prohibition on indiscriminate weapons is codified 
in Article 51(4)(c) of Additional Protocol I, and reflects customary 
international law.42 It disallows weapon systems that, despite being able to 
strike their targets accurately, have uncontrollable effects. The paradigmatic 
example is a biological contagion used to infect combatants, the subsequent 
spread of which is uncontrollable. A weapon with such effects could be 
mounted on an autonomous platform. Another example is an autonomous 
weapon system that searches for and conducts cyber attacks against dual-use 
infrastructure (cyber infrastructure used by both the military and civilians). 
The malware used to conduct the attacks could be indiscriminate if designed 
in a way that makes it likely to spread into the civilian network.43 
 
III. Unlawful Use of Lawful Weapon Systems 
 
As should be apparent, the likelihood of an autonomous weapon 
system being unlawful per se is very low. This being so, the question becomes 
whether international humanitarian law provides sufficient safeguards with 
respect to the use of these weapon systems. Sadly, the unlawful use of lawful 
weapons is far from rare during armed conflicts. 
 
The seminal principle of international humanitarian law is 
distinction. It is one of two principles in this body of law recognized as 
“cardinal” by the International Court of Justice, which has also 
characterized it as “intransgressible.”44 The principle of distinction serves as 
the fount for the international humanitarian law rules, including those 
regarding the use of weapon systems, that seek to safeguard civilians, civilian 
objects, and other protected persons and places during the conduct of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 DoD DIRECTIVE 3000.09, supra note 9, ¶ 4a(1)(b), requires measures to be taken to 
ensure that autonomous weapon systems “[c]omplete engagements in a timeframe 
consistent with commander and operator intentions and, if unable to do so, terminate 
engagements or seek additional human operator input before continuing the engagement.” 
42 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY, supra note 6, rules 12 & 
71.See also Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 8(2)(b)(xx); COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra 
note 6, ¶ 5.3.2. 
43 Injury or physical damage would have to result in the case of the cyber attack. TALLINN 
MANUAL, supra note 6, rule 43 and accompanying commentary. 
44 Nuclear Weapons, supra note 25, ¶¶ 78–79, 
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hostilities. Article 48 of Additional Protocol I codifies this customary law 
principle45: “In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian 
population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times 
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between 
civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their 
operations only against military objectives.”  
 
Distinction is operationalized in a number of rules, the two most 
fundamental being the customary law prohibitions on making civilians and 
civilian objects the object of attack.46 They are codified in Articles 51(2) and 
52(1) of Additional Protocol I respectively.47 Self-evidently, it would be 
unlawful to use an autonomous weapon system to directly attack civilians or 
civilian objects. In this regard, note that the same issues that present 
themselves with regard to other weapons systems also appear in the case of 
autonomous weapon systems. For instance, the exception to the prohibition 
on attacking civilians that exists for those who directly participate in 
hostilities also applies to the use of autonomous weapon systems against 
them.48 Similarly, the universally accepted definition of military objectives 
found in Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I pertains equally to attacks by 
autonomous weapon systems on objects, as does the controversy over 
whether war-sustaining objects qualify as military objectives.49 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY, supra note 6, rule 1.  
46 As to civilians, see id., rules 1 & 6; Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 8(2)(b)(i); 
COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 6, ¶ 8.3. As to civilian objects, see CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY, supra note 6, rules 7, 9 & 10; Rome Statute, 
supra note 6, art. 8(2)(b)(ii); COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 6, ¶ 8.3. 
47 On Article 51(2), see ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 25, ¶¶ 1938–1941; Bothe, supra 
note 25, at 300. On Article 52(1), see ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 25, ¶¶ 2011–2013; 
Bothe, supra note 25, at 322. Note that Article 51(2), in a provision that reflects customary 
law, prohibits “acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror 
among the civilian population.” CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
STUDY, supra note 6, rule 2. This prohibition would apply equally to attacks with 
autonomous weapon systems designed to spread terror. 
48 Additional Protocol I, supra note 25, art. 51(3); CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY, supra note 6, rule 6. 
49 Although the United States accepts the definition of military objectives set forth in 
Additional Protocol I, Article 52(2), as an accurate articulation of the customary law norm, 
its explanation of the concept in the Commander’s Handbook extends the definition to 
objects that sustain the war effort, such as oil exports. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra 
note 6, ¶ 8.2. For a discussion of the controversy, see TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 6, 
commentary accompanying rule 38; Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting in Operational Law, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 245, 254 (Terry 
Gill & Dieter Fleck eds., 2010). 
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Article 51(4)(a), which reflects customary international law, sets forth 
a further prohibition on indiscriminate attacks by banning those that are not 
directed at an unlawful target, and, as a result, are of a nature to strike 
lawful targets and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.50 This 
prohibition differs from that on indiscriminate weapons in that in this case 
the weapon is capable of being aimed at a lawful target, but the attacker 
does not do so.51 
 
Doubt⎯the lack of certainty that a person is a lawful target⎯is of 
particular importance in respect to this prohibition. During an attack, doubt 
as to status must be resolved in favor of treating the individual in question as 
immune from attack. Article 50(1) of Additional Protocol I codifies this 
presumption, which is generally characterized as customary in nature.52 
 
The mere existence of some doubt does not bring the presumption 
into operation.53 Rather, the degree of doubt that bars attack is that which 
would cause a reasonable attacker in the same or similar circumstances to 
hesitate before attacking. Restated, attackers must act responsibly as a 
matter of law when conducting military operations. They must consider 
“the information from all sources which is reasonably available to them at 
the relevant time,”54 as well as factors like force protection, the military 
value of the target, and the likelihood that subsequent opportunities to 
conduct an attack will present themselves.  
 
The fact that the doubt threshold is framed in terms of human 
reasonableness complicates translation into the autonomy context. 
Obviously, development of an algorithm that can both precisely meter 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY, supra note 6, rules 11–12; 
see also COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 6, ¶ 5.3.2. On Article 51(4)(a), see ICRC 
COMMENTARY, supra note 25, ¶¶ 1951–1955. 
51 As noted by Yoram Dinstein, “The key to finding that a certain attack has been 
indiscriminate is the nonchalant state of mind of the attacker.” Dinstein, supra note 7, at 
127. 
52 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY, supra note 6, commentary 
accompanying rule 6. On Article 50(1), see ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 25, ¶¶ 1911–
1921; Bothe, supra note 25, at 295–296. 
53 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 6, commentary accompanying rule 33. 
54 U.K. Statement made upon Ratification of Additional Protocols I and II, ¶ (h), reprinted in 
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 511 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 
2000) [hereinafter U.K. Ratification Statement]; U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE JOINT 
SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, JSP 383 (2004), ¶ 5.4.3. 
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doubt and reliably factor in the unique situation in which the autonomous 
weapon system is being operated will prove highly challenging. After all, 
artificial intelligence is artificial. 
 
Detailed discussion of the technical mechanisms for determining 
doubt is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, algorithms attributing 
values to sensor data, thereby enabling the autonomous weapon system to 
compute doubt (or, since it is a machine, the likelihood of being a lawful 
target), are theoretically achievable. For instance, autonomous weapon 
systems could be equipped with sensors that enable them to determine when 
a potential target is a child. Such a determination would substantially 
decrease the probability that the target is a combatant. On the other hand, 
if the sensors ascertain that a potential target is carrying a weapon or 
engaging in hostilities (for instance, by launching a missile or firing a 
weapon), the likelihood of the target being a combatant increases. These are 
overly simplistic examples offered for the sake of illustration; the actual 
sensor capabilities of autonomous weapon systems will be much more 
advanced.  
 
Since such determinations are highly contextual, it will prove more 
problematic to decide upon the doubt threshold at which an autonomous 
weapon system will be programmed to refrain from attack. For instance, 
more doubt can be countenanced on a “hot” battlefield than in a relatively 
benign environment. The key is human interaction with the system. In 
theory, human operators could program these and other factors into an 
autonomous weapon system. Should they set unreasonably high thresholds 
of doubt (that is, the point where the systems will not attack), the system 
would violate the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks. 
 
No equivalent presumption exists in the lex scripta for objects. Still, 
clearly an attack based on an unreasonable conclusion that an object is a 
military objective violates international humanitarian law. The mode of 
analysis described above for persons would apply equally to objects. In 
addition, Article 52(3) of Additional Protocol I sets forth a separate rule with 
regard to objects normally dedicated to civilian purposes: “In case of doubt 
whether [such] an object . . . is being used to make an effective contribution 
to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.”55 Some difference 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Additional Protocol I, supra note 25, art. 52(3). On Article 52(3), see ICRC 
COMMENTARY, supra note 25, ¶¶ 2029–2037; Bothe, supra note 25, at 326–327. 
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of opinion exists over whether this presumption reflects customary law.56 In 
light of that disagreement, the international group of experts that drafted 
the Tallinn Manual took the admittedly tautological position that in case of 
doubt such an object may only be attacked “following a careful 
assessment.”57  
 
Ultimately, there is little difference between application of the rules 
governing attacks on individuals and objects. An autonomous weapon 
system that lacks any capability to distinguish lawful from unlawful targets 
may not be used where the two are co-located. In addition, human 
operators must be able to program acceptable levels of doubt, based on the 
circumstances in which they will be used, into the systems. Failure to 
comply with these requirements would constitute an indiscriminate attack. 
 
An attack that is directed against a lawful target must nevertheless 
comply with the rule of proportionality. The customary international 
humanitarian law rule of proportionality, codified in Articles 51(5)(b) and 
57(2)(iii) of Additional Protocol I, prohibits “an attack which may be 
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to 
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”58 This 
rule is among the most complex and misunderstood in international 
humanitarian law with respect to both interpretation and application.59 
 
Selection of targets by autonomous weapon systems would not 
absolve humans of responsibility for attacks conducted in violation of the 
rule of proportionality. Most importantly, a human operator who launches 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 See CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY, supra note 6, 
commentary accompanying rule 10. 
57 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 6, rule 40 and accompanying commentary. 
58 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY, supra note 6, rule 14;  see 
also COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 6, ¶ 5.3.3. 
59 To take one common example, the collateral damage caused during an attack or the 
failure to achieve an attack’s military aim are often relied upon when characterizing a 
particular attack as violating the rule. Such an approach is counter-normative because the 
rule of proportionality is evaluated ex ante, not post factum. For instance, if an attacker 
reasonably expects to cause five incidental deaths, but the strike causes fifteen, the 
proportionality rule was not violated so long as five is not excessive in light of the 
anticipated military advantage. On proportionality generally, see William J. Fenrick, The 
Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91 (1982), available 
at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Military_Law_Review/pdf-
files/277C87~1.pdf.  
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an autonomous weapon system into a situation in which the ensuing attacks 
are likely to cause excessive collateral damage has violated the rule. When 
making judgments as to possible violations, both the system’s capabilities 
and the environment in which it will operate have to be considered. For 
instance, a violation would occur if the autonomous system served as a 
platform for weapons that are insufficiently precise to be used in the 
particular setting, such as a city, and, as a result, harm to civilians and 
civilian objects was probably going to be excessive to the military gains. 
 
A matter that has drawn a great deal of attention in discussions 
about autonomous weapon systems is their capability to perform 
proportionality calculations. Recall that autonomous weapon systems 
employed in an area where civilians and civilian objects are present must 
possess some means of distinguishing them from lawful targets. If an 
autonomous weapon system locates a person or object, but cannot 
satisfactorily identify it as a lawful target, the system must treat that person 
or object as civilian. Any harm expected to befall the person or object 
during an attack on a valid military target would have to be factored into 
the proportionality calculation as collateral damage. 
 
Proportionality calculations require consideration of both expected 
collateral damage and anticipated military advantage. A system already 
exists for determining the likelihood of collateral damage to objects or 
persons near a target. The “collateral damage estimate methodology” 
(CDEM) is a procedure whereby an attacking force considers such factors as 
the precision of a weapon, its blast effect, attack tactics, the probability of 
civilian presence in structures near the target, and the composition of 
structures to estimate the number of civilian casualties likely to be caused 
during an attack.60 CDEM does not resolve whether a particular attack 
complies with the rule of proportionality. Instead, it is a policy-related 
instrument used to determine the level of command at which an attack 
causing collateral damage must be authorized. Oversimplified, the policy of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 For a discussion of the methodology, see Collateral Damage Estimation Brief: Panel Discussion: 
Major Jeffrey Thurnher and Major Timothy Kelly (U.S. Naval War College Oct. 23, 2012), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AvdXJV-N56A&list=PLam-
yp5uUR1YEwLbqC0IPrP4EhWOeTf8v&index=1&feature=plpp_video; see also Defense 
Intelligence Agency General Counsel, Briefing: Joint Targeting Cycle and Collateral Damage 
Estimate Methodology (CDM), (Nov. 10, 2009), 
http://www.aclu.org/files/dronefoia/dod/drone_dod_ACLU_DRONES_JOINT_STAF
F_SLIDES_1-47.pdf. 
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those armed forces utilizing the methodology is that the higher the likely 
collateral damage, the higher the required approval authority. 
 
The commander with authority to authorize the attack makes the 
proportionality determination as part of the attack’s approval process. It is 
this individual who factors in the other essential element of a proportionality 
calculation, that is, the anticipated military advantage of the attack.61 Such 
determinations are contextual. For instance, an attack on a command-and-
control facility expected to cause five civilian deaths at an early stage of the 
conflict yields greater military advantage than an attack on the same facility 
that occurs after enemy forces are in disarray and nearing defeat. Similarly, 
the destruction of a tank that is distant from the frontlines does not yield as 
much military advantage as destruction of one effectively firing on friendly 
forces. Because it is contextual, the military advantage element of the 
proportionality rule generally necessitates case-by-case determinations. 
 
There is no question that autonomous weapon systems could be 
programmed to perform CDEM-like analyses to determine the likelihood of 
harm to civilians in the target area. Moreover, these weapon systems would 
usually be no less likely to generate a reliable result than CDEM since the 
latter is heavily reliant on scientific algorithms. The more difficult task for 
the autonomous weapon system would be assessing military advantage. 
Given the complexity and fluidity of the modern battlespace, it is unlikely in 
the near future that, despite impressive advances in artificial intelligence, 
“machines” will be programmable to perform robust assessments of a 
strike’s likely military advantage. In part, this leads Human Rights Watch to 
conclude that the proportionality test “requires more than a balancing of 
quantitative data, and a robot could not be programmed to duplicate the 
psychological processes in human judgment that are necessary to assess 
proportionality.”62 
 
Yet, military advantage algorithms could in theory be programmed 
into autonomous weapon systems. For example, the systems could be pre-
programmed with unacceptable collateral damage thresholds for particular 
target sets or situations. As an example, an autonomous weapon system 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 A word of caution is necessary: a commander’s decision does not relieve others involved 
in an attack of their own responsibility for compliance with international humanitarian law. 
Even a commander’s order must be disobeyed if it is manifestly unlawful. See, e.g., Rome 
Statute, supra note 6, art. 33. 
62 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 33. 
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could be pre-programmed with a base maximum collateral damage level of 
X for a tank; a human would have already made the determination that X 
generally comports with the proportionality rule. Such thresholds would 
have to be adjustable by human operators based on the military situation at 
a particular phase in the conflict, in a particular area of operations, and so 
forth. Of course, determining the appropriate threshold would be a very 
subjective endeavour. However, as noted by the ICRC commentary to 
Additional Protocol I, and as acknowledged in Losing Humanity, 
proportionality determinations necessarily involve a “fairly broad margin of 
judgment” and “must above all be a question of common sense and good 
faith for military commanders.”63  
 
Because military advantage is such a context specific value, 
compliance with the rule of proportionality would require that the base 
maximum collateral damage threshold be very conservative. Algorithms 
could be then be developed that would permit the autonomous weapon 
system to refine the base level threshold to account for specified variables it 
encountered on a mission. As an example, it would be reasonable to allow 
the system to increase the level of acceptable collateral damage if it identifies 
a concentration of enemy tanks, as distinct from a single tank. The 
concentration poses a greater threat and therefore the military advantage of 
destroying individual tanks making up the concentration is greater than that 
of destroying the same tanks when they are operating alone. Similarly, it 
would be reasonable for the system to adjust the level of acceptable 
collateral damage based on whether a targeted tank is headed towards or 
away from the battlefront.  
 
These highly simplistic examples are offered solely for the sake of 
illustrating the point that the requirement to assess military advantage need 
not be an insurmountable obstacle. Obviously, the actual algorithms used 
would need to be much more sophisticated. While they would likely not be 
able to account for all imaginable scenarios and variables that might occur 
during hostilities, the same is true of a human confronted with unexpected 
or confusing events when making a time sensitive decision in combat. 
Neither the human nor the machine is held to a standard of perfection; on 
the contrary, in international humanitarian law the standard is always one 
of reasonableness. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 33; ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 25, ¶ 2208; 
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Human Rights Watch also cites the principle of “military necessity” 
as a basis for finding autonomous weapon systems unlawful.64 In the 
author’s view, the organization mischaracterizes military necessity as a 
distinct rule of international humanitarian law, rather than a foundational 
principle that undergirds the entire body of law.65 Despite the different 
approaches to military necessity adopted by the author and Human Rights 
Watch, it is clear that even military necessity as understood by that 
organization would not render autonomous weapon systems unlawful. They 
would not be unlawful per se because it is clear that autonomous weapon 
systems may be used in situations in which they are valuable militarily—that 
is, militarily necessary. As to prohibitions based on use, the condition that 
military objectives yield some military advantage would make any separate 
requirement for military necessity superfluous.66 With regard to situations 
raising proportionality issues, any strike lacking military advantage but 
causing harm to civilians or civilian objects would violate the rule.67 Taking 
these observations together, the result is that military necessity has no 
independent valence when assessing the legality of autonomous weapon 
systems or their use. 
 
Losing Humanity somewhat inexplicably fails to examine a central 
element in every assessment of a weapon system’s use: the international 
humanitarian law requirement that the attacker take precautions in attack.68 
Set forth in Article 57 of Additional Protocol I, the rule, which reflects 
customary international law, requires an attacker to exercise “constant care 
. . . to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.”69 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 34–35. Military necessity was originally described in 
the “Lieber Code”: “the necessity of those measures which are indispensible for securing 
the ends of [the] war, and which are lawful according to the modern law[s] and usages of 
war.” U.S. WAR DEP’T, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE 
UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD, General Orders No. 100 (Apr. 24, 1863), art. 14, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/110?OpenDocument. 
65 The author's views on the subject are set forth in Military Necessity and Humanity in 
International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA.  J. INT’L L. 795, 795–839 
(2010). 
66 Additional Protocol I, supra note 25, art. 52(2). 
67 Id., arts. 51(5)(b) & 57(2)(iii). 
68 See generally A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD, ch. 5 (3d. ed., 2012). 
69 Additional Protocol I, art. 57(1). See also CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW STUDY, supra note 6, rule 15; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 6, ¶ 8.1. Other 
treaty instruments include the requirement. See Second Protocol to the Hague Convention 
of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, art. 7(b), 
Mar. 26, 1999, 2253 U.N.T.S. 212; Protocol (to the Convention on Prohibitions or 
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article goes on to articulate the means by which this obligation is to be 
carried out. In particular, an attacker is required to “do everything feasible 
to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian 
objects and are not subject to special protection but are military objectives”; 
cancel an attack if it becomes apparent that the rule of proportionality will 
be breached; provide “effective advance warning” of an attack if it may 
affect the civilian population, “unless circumstances do not permit”; 
“[w]hen a choice is possible between several military objectives for 
obtaining a similar military advantage, [select] that the attack on which may 
be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian 
objects”; and “take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and 
methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian 
objects.”70 
 
Each of these obligations applies fully to the use of autonomous 
weapon systems. The requirement to do everything feasible to verify that 
the target is a military objective would, for example, require full use of on-
board or external sensors that could boost the reliability of target 
identification. In fact, an autonomous weapon system could not be used in 
isolation if additional external means of identifying the target would 
measurably improve identification and their use was militarily feasible in the 
circumstances. As an illustration, such a situation might present itself if an 
unmanned aerial system could be used to narrow down the location of 
enemy forces before the autonomous weapon system is launched into that 
area. This would reduce the likelihood of the system’s misidentification of 
civilians as combatants.  
 
The fulcrum of the verification requirement is the term “feasible.” 
Feasible has been interpreted as that which is “practicable or practically 
possible, taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be 
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects) on Prohibitions or Restrictions on 
the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on May 3, 1996, art. 3(10), 
2048 U.N.T.S. 133; Protocol (to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use 
of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or 
to Have Indiscriminate Effects) on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-
Traps and Other Devices, art. 3(4), Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168. 
70 Additional Protocol I, supra note 25, art. 57 (2)–(3); CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY, supra note 6, rules 16–21. On Article 57, see ICRC 
COMMENTARY, supra note 25, ¶¶ 2184–2238; BOTHE, supra note 25, at 359–369. 
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humanitarian and military considerations.”71 Military considerations 
include both technical and operational factors. Thus, in the previous 
example, sending an unmanned aerial system into an area of operations that 
could place it at a degree of risk not justified by the extent of enhanced 
identification capability would not be feasible. This might be because the 
aerial system is needed for operations elsewhere of greater military value or 
because its use in other operations may have a greater prospect for the 
avoidance of civilian casualties. 
 
The requirement to select among military objectives to minimize 
civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects would likewise apply to 
autonomous weapon systems. For instance, an autonomous weapon system 
could not be employed to attack electrical substations if attacking 
transmission lines was militarily feasible, would achieve the same military 
objective (such as temporarily disrupting enemy command and control 
during friendly operations), and placed civilians and civilian objects at less 
risk. 
 
However, it is the requirement to select the means of warfare likely 
to cause the least harm to civilians and civilian objects without sacrificing 
military advantage that is the key to the controversy over autonomous 
weapon systems. Indeed, it is the oft-ignored linchpin to various other 
weapon controversies, such as that surrounding the use of unmanned aerial 
combat systems. Consider the practical implications of this prescriptive 
norm: if the use of an autonomous weapon system can be expected to cause 
greater collateral damage than the use of a weapon system under human 
control, and the use of the latter is neither likely to diminish the probability 
that the desired military objective will be achieved nor poses a significant 
risk to the human operator, use of the autonomous weapon system would be 
forbidden as a matter of law. Restated, the only situation in which an 
autonomous weapon system can lawfully be employed is when its use will 
realize military objectives that cannot be attained by other available systems 
that would cause less collateral damage. Of course, there is a fair degree of 
elasticity in application of the norm given that it is based on the feasibility of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Protocol (to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects) on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps 
and Other Devices, amended May 3, 1996, art. 3(10), 2048 U.N.T.S. 133; U.K. Ratification 
Statement, supra note 54, ¶ (b). See also Commander’s Handbook, supra note 6, ¶ 8.3.1; 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY, supra note 6, commentary 
accompanying rule 15. 
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the competing systems’ use. Nevertheless, the requirement to select among 
means of warfare should significantly temper the concerns of those who 
would prophylactically prohibit use of autonomous weapon systems. 
 
Indeed, contemplate the consequences of prohibiting autonomous 
weapon systems completely. What critics miss is that an autonomous 
weapon system may be able to achieve a military objective with less threat of 
collateral damage than a human controlled system. For example, an 
autonomous weapon system could be armed with non-lethal weapons 
unavailable on manned systems, its sensor suite could be more precise or 
discriminatory than one available on manned systems, or its decision-
making capability could be better than that of a human in a particular 
environment (such as a very dangerous one). If the use of the human 
controlled system in question comports with the rule of proportionality, it 
would be lawful for an attacker to use it in the absence of the autonomous 
weapon system. Therefore, the prohibition of autonomous weapon systems 
would actually place civilians and civilian property at greater risk of 
incidental harm than if the autonomous weapon system had been available 
to the attacker. 
 
Some States are beginning to set forth autonomous weapon systems 
guidelines that are meant to foster compliance with international 
humanitarian law in addition to achieving other objectives, such as avoiding 
mistaken engagements. For instance, the current U.S. policy, which 
distinguishes between semi-autonomous weapon systems, human-supervised 
autonomous weapon systems, and autonomous weapon systems, provides: 
 
(1) Semi-autonomous weapon systems (including manned or 
unmanned platforms, munitions, or sub-munitions that 
function as semi-autonomous weapon systems or as 
subcomponents of semi-autonomous weapon systems) may 
be used to apply lethal or non-lethal, kinetic or non-kinetic 
force. Semi-autonomous weapon systems that are onboard or 
integrated with unmanned platforms must be designed such 
that, in the event of degraded or lost communications, the 
system does not autonomously select and engage individual 
targets or specific target groups that have not been previously 
selected by an authorized human operator.  
(2) Human-supervised autonomous weapon systems may be 
used to select and engage targets, with the exception of 
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selecting humans as targets, for local defense to intercept 
attempted time-critical or saturation attacks for:  
(a) Static defense of manned installations.  
(b) Onboard defense of manned platforms.  
(3) Autonomous weapon systems may be used to apply non-
lethal, non-kinetic force, such as some forms of electronic 
attack, against materiel targets in accordance with 
[applicable directives]. 
 
The policy acknowledges that autonomous or semi-autonomous 
weapon systems might be intended for use in a manner falling outside these 
policies. In such cases, it mandates high-level approval before formal 
development and then again before fielding the system.72 This requirement 
is in addition to the legal review requirements set forth below. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 DoD DIRECTIVE 3000.09, supra note 9, ¶ 4d. Approval by the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required. Prior to formal 
development the following are required: 
 
(1) The system design incorporates the necessary capabilities to allow 
commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human 
judgment in the use of force.  
(2) The system is designed to complete engagements in a timeframe 
consistent with commander and operator intentions and, if unable to do 
so, to terminate engagements or seek additional human operator input 
before continuing the engagement.  
(3) The system design, including safeties, anti-tamper mechanisms, and 
information assurance . . . addresses and minimizes the probability or 
consequences of failures that could lead to unintended engagements or to 
loss of control of the system.  
(4) Plans are in place for [verification and validation] and [test and 
evaluation] to establish system reliability, effectiveness, and suitability 
under realistic conditions, including possible adversary actions, to a 
sufficient standard consistent with the potential consequences of an 
unintended engagement or loss of control of the system.  
(5) A preliminary legal review of the weapon system has been completed, 
in coordination with the General Counsel of the Department of Defense . 
. . and in accordance with [the relevant policy guidance]. 
 
Id., encl 3, ¶ 1a. Before fielding, the review must assess: 
 
(1) System capabilities, human-machine interfaces, doctrine, TTPs, and 
training have demonstrated the capability to allow commanders and 
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IV. Legal Review of Weapon Systems 
 
Since the prospect of autonomous weapon systems is so new, the 
requirement to conduct a review of their legality looms large.73 Codified in 
Article 36 of Additional Protocol I, the rule provides that “in the study, 
development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of 
warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine 
whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited 
by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the 
High Contracting Party.”74 Means of warfare are weapons and weapon 
systems, whereas method of warfare refers to the tactics, techniques and 
procedures (TTP) by which hostilities are conducted. An autonomous 
weapon system is a means of warfare. Employing multiple autonomous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment in the use of 
force and to employ systems with appropriate care and in accordance 
with the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and 
applicable ROE. 
(2) Sufficient safeties, anti-tamper mechanisms, and information 
assurance in accordance with Reference (a) have been implemented to 
minimize the probability or consequences of failures that could lead to 
unintended engagements or to loss of control of the system.  
(3) V&V and T&E assess system performance, capability, reliability, 
effectiveness, and suitability under realistic conditions, including possible 
adversary actions, consistent with the potential consequences of an 
unintended engagement or loss of control of the system.  
(4) Adequate training, TTPs, and doctrine are available, periodically 
reviewed, and used by system operators and commanders to understand 
the functioning, capabilities, and limitations of the system’s autonomy in 
realistic operational conditions.  
(5) System design and human-machine interfaces are readily 
understandable to trained operators, provide traceable feedback on 
system status, and provide clear procedures for trained operators to 
activate and deactivate system functions.  
(6) A legal review of the weapon system has been completed, in 
coordination with the [the DoD General Counsel and relevant policy 
guidance]. 
 
Id., encl. 3, ¶ 1b. 
73 On weapons review generally, see BOOTHBY, supra note 23, at 340–52; W. Hays Parks, 
Conventional Weapons and Weapons Reviews, 8 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 55 (2005). 
74 On Article 36, see ICRC Commentary, supra note 25, ¶¶ 1463–1482; BOTHE, supra note 
25, at 199–201. 
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weapon systems to conduct, for example, a siege by targeting all vehicular 
traffic into or out of a populated area illustrates their use as a method of 
warfare. 
 
Although Human Rights Watch suggests that disagreement exists as 
to whether Article 36 restates customary international law,75 the obligation 
to conduct legal reviews of new means of warfare before their use is generally 
considered—and correctly so—reflective of customary international law.76 
Consensus is lacking as to whether an analogous requirement exists to 
perform legal reviews of methods of warfare.77  
 
States that are Party to Additional Protocol I are clearly required to 
conduct a legal review of both the autonomous weapon system and any 
TTP that its user develops. Non-Party States are arguably only bound by 
the obligation to review the system itself in light of its envisaged usage. This 
author is of the opinion that both reviews—whether or not legally 
mandated—are well-advised whenever feasible. 
 
Human Rights Watch also advises that reviews of autonomous 
weapon systems “should take place at the earliest stage possible and 
continue through any development that proceeds.”78 For States Party to 
Additional Protocol I, this is, as is clear from the plain text of Article 36, a 
legal requirement. Since there is no corresponding customary international 
humanitarian law requirement, non-Party States, such as the United States, 
are only required to ensure weapons are lawful before use. Nevertheless, the 
organization is right to stress that early legal reviews can shape the 
development stage of a weapon system and resultantly avoid unnecessary 
effort and cost associated with components and capabilities that may not 
pass legal muster. It is U.S. policy to conduct two legal reviews, once prior 
to taking the decision to enter into formal development, and again before an 
autonomous weapon system is fielded.79  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 21. 
76 See, e.g., Air and Missile Warfare Manual, supra note 6, rule 9; TALLINN MANUAL, supra 
note 6, rule 48. 
77 See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 6, commentary accompanying rule 48. 
78 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 22. 
79 DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.09, supra note 9, encl. 3, ¶¶ 1a(5) and 1b(6). Additional U.S. 
policy guidance on legal reviews is contained in DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 5000.01, THE 
DEFENSE ACQUISITION SYSTEM (May 12, 2003) [hereinafter DOD DIRECTIVE 5000.01]; 
DEPT OF DEF., INSTRUCTION 5000.02, OPERATION OF THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION 
SYSTEM (Dec. 8, 2008); DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 3000.03, POLICY FOR NON-LETHAL 
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Losing Humanity appears to infer that the United States has taken the 
position that only a weapon—and not the weapon system—need be 
examined. Putting individual cases where the United States may or may not 
have complied with the requirement for legal reviews aside, it is presently 
U.S. policy to review both weapons and weapon systems. This obligation is 
unambiguously confirmed in a Department of Defense directive which 
provides that “[t]he acquisition and procurement of DoD weapons and 
weapon systems shall be consistent with all applicable domestic law and 
treaties and international agreements . . . , customary international law, and 
the law of armed conflict . . . . An attorney authorized to conduct such legal 
reviews in the Department shall conduct the legal review of the intended 
acquisition of weapons or weapons systems.”80  
 
Human Rights Watch expressed particular concern regarding the 
possibility of autonomous weapon systems modification. It noted “robots . . . 
are complex systems that often combine a multitude of components that 
work differently in different combinations.”81 The organization also 
highlighted “the fact that some robotic technology, while not inherently 
harmful, has the potential one day to be weaponized.”82 A fair reading of 
the international humanitarian law norm is that any significant modification 
to a weapon system requires legal review. The United States agrees. For 
example, the U.S. Air Force policy on weapon reviews specifically mandates 
“a timely legal review of all weapons and cyber capabilities, whether a new 
weapon or cyber capability at an early stage of the acquisition process, or a 
contemplated modification of an existing weapon or cyber capability, to ensure 
legality under LOAC, domestic law and international law prior to their 
acquisition for use in a conflict or other military operation.”83 To 
summarize, U.S. policy is to review all weapons, their associated delivery 
systems, and any significant modification of them. This policy 
unquestionably applies to autonomous weapon systems.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
WEAPONS (July 9, 1996); and DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 2311.01E, DOD LAW OF WAR 
PROGRAM (May 9, 2006). 
80 DOD DIRECTIVE 5000.01, supra note 79, encl. 1, ¶ E1.1.15 (emphasis added). 
81 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 23. 
82 Id. 
83 U.S. AIR FORCE, INSTRUCTION 51-402, LEGAL REVIEW OF WEAPONS AND CYBER 
CAPABILITIES para. 1.3.1 (July 27, 2011)  [hereinafter AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 51-402] 
(emphasis added). 
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Losing Humanity cites an array of legal prohibitions for consideration 
during the legal review. However, the report is overinclusive in that a 
number of the prohibitions cited bear primarily on the unlawful use of 
lawful weapons. Legal reviews do not generally consider use issues since 
they are contextual by nature, whereas the sole context in a determination 
of whether a weapon is lawful per se is its intended use in the abstract.84 For 
instance, the rule of proportionality does not factor into a weapons review 
because compliance depends on the situational risk to civilians and civilian 
objects and the anticipated military advantage in the attendant 
circumstances. Because the assessment is contextual, it is generally 
inappropriate to make ex ante judgments as to a weapon’s compliance with 
the rule. Only if the weapon system were necessarily employed in situations 
where injury to civilians or harm to civilian objects is inevitable and 
predictable in scope—as in a cyber malware weapon developed for a 
particular attack—would such an assessment have to be made prior to 
fielding of the weapon. The requirement that an attacker take feasible 
precautions in attack to minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects is 
likewise context specific and, therefore, any assessment of compliance with 
the norm can only occur with respect to its use in particular circumstances, 
not as part of the legal review. 
 
The Air Force guidance delineates the legal issues that must be 
examined when determining the legality of a weapon system being 
considered for acquisition:  
 
3.1.1. Whether there is a specific rule of law, whether by 
treaty obligation of the United States or accepted by the 
United States as customary international law, prohibiting or 
restricting the use of the weapon or cyber capability in 
question.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 The Committee Report on the Article presented to the Diplomatic Conference 
emphasizes that the rule:  
 
[I]s not meant to imply an obligation “to foresee or analyze all possible 
misuse of a weapon, for any weapon can be misused in a way that would 
be prohibited.” The meaning of the phrase is to require a determination 
whether the employment for its normal or expected use would be prohibited 
under some or all circumstances. 
 
BOTHE, supra note 25, at 200–201. 
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3.1.2. If there is no express prohibition, the following 
questions are considered:  
3.1.2.1. Whether the weapon or cyber capability is 
calculated to cause superfluous injury, in violation of 
Article 23(e) of the Annex to Hague Convention IV; 
and  
3.1.2.2. Whether the weapon or cyber capability is 
capable of being directed against a specific military 
objective and, if not, is of a nature to cause an effect 
on military objectives and civilians or civilian objects 
without distinction.85  
 
The requirements set forth in paragraph 3.1.2 mirror analogous provisions 
appearing in Additional Protocol I, all of which are customary in nature.86  
 
The Air Force guidance’s extension of its substantive requirements 
to cyber capabilities, a relatively recent revision to the basic document, is 
noteworthy. It illustrates the principle that the rules of international 
humanitarian law regarding the legality of weapon systems apply fully to 
weapons that did not exist at the time a particular treaty norm was crafted 
or customary law crystallized.87 It is incontrovertible that all of the norms 
discussed apply equally to autonomous weapon systems. 
 
Finally, Human Rights Watch asserts that legal reviews “should 
assess a weapon under the Martens Clause,” a proposition echoed by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross.88 The clause originally appeared 
in the 1899 Hague Convention II and was subsequently included in both 
the 1907 version of that treaty and Additional Protocol I.89 The 
International Court of Justice recognizes it as customary in nature and has 
observed that the Martens Clause “proved to be an effective means of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 51-402, supra note 83, ¶¶ 3.1.1.–3.1.2.2. Note that the 
reference to effects in the Air Force guidance covers both immediate effects and those 
which spread, thereby encompassing both the situations envisaged in Additional Protocol I, 
art. 51(4)(b) & art. 51(4)(c). 
86 Additional Protocol I, supra note 25, arts. 35(2), 51(4)(b) -(c). 
87 Nuclear Weapons, supra note 25, ¶ 86.  
88 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 25; ICRC, A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, 
Means and Methods of Warfare: Measures to Implement Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977, ¶ 
1.2.2.3 (2006). 
89 1899 Hague II, supra note 24, pmbl; 1907 Hague IV, supra note 24, pmbl; Additional 
Protocol I, supra note 25, art. 1(2).  
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addressing rapid evolution of military technology.”90 
 
By its own terms, though, the clause applies only in the absence of 
treaty law.91 In other words, it is a failsafe mechanism meant to address 
lacunae in the law; it does not act as an overarching principle that must be 
considered in every case. Today, a rich fabric of treaty law governs the 
legality of weapon systems. Certain of these treaties bear directly on the 
development of autonomous weapon systems. The restrictions on 
incendiary weapons, air delivered antipersonnel mines, and cluster 
munitions, for example, limit their employment on autonomous weapon 
systems by States Party to the respective treaties.92 As discussed above, 
general principles and rules of international humanitarian treaty law, 
particularly those contained in Additional Protocol I, further restrict 
weaponry. Emergence of many customary international humanitarian law 
norms since 1899 also measurably diminishes the significance of the clause. 
By the turn of the 21st century, the likelihood that future weapon systems, 
including those that might be autonomous, would not violate applicable 
treaty and customary law, but be unlawful based on the Martens Clause, 
had become exceptionally low. 
 
Losing Humanity is correct to accentuate the importance of weapons 
reviews in the process of developing and fielding new weaponry. However, 
it must be cautioned that such reviews examine only the legality of a 
weapon system as such, not its use in any particular circumstance. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Nuclear Weapons, supra note 25, ¶¶ 78, 84. 
91 The text of the clause refers to “cases not covered by this Protocol or by other 
international agreements.”  Additional Protocol I, supra note 25, art. 1(2). 
92 See Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate 
Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137; Protocol (to the Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be 
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects) on Prohibitions and Restrictions on 
the Use of Incendiary Weapons, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 171; Protocol (to the 
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects) on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, Oct. 
10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168; Protocol (to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions 
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively 
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects) on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 
Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on May 3, 1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 133; 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
Antipersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507; 
Convention on Cluster Munitions, Dec. 3, 2008, 48 I.L.M. 357. 
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Therefore, it is doubtful whether the requirement for the reviews will serve 
as an impediment to the development of autonomous weapon systems as a 
class of weapons. 
 
V. Accountability 
 
Human Rights Watch expresses anxiety regarding accountability for 
the activities of fully autonomous weapons. It asks the very reasonable 
question: “If the killing were done by a fully autonomous weapon, . . . the 
question would become: whom to hold responsible?” The organization 
concludes that, “[s]ince there is no fair and effective way to assign legal 
responsibility for unlawful acts committed by fully autonomous weapons, 
granting them complete control over targeting decisions would undermine 
yet another tool for promoting civilian protection.”93 
 
The problem with this conclusion is that it is based on a false 
premise.94 The mere fact that a human might not be in control of a 
particular engagement does not mean that no human is responsible for the 
actions of the autonomous weapon system.95 A human must decide how to 
program the system. Self-evidently, that individual would be accountable for 
programming it to engage in actions that amounted to war crimes. 
Moreover, the commander or civilian supervisor of that individual would be 
accountable for those war crimes if he or she knew or should have known 
that the autonomous weapon system had been so programmed and did 
nothing to stop its use, or later became aware that the system had been 
employed in a manner constituting a war crime and did nothing to hold the 
individuals concerned accountable.96  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 42. 
94 On accountability, see generally Rogers, supra note 68, at 360 & ch. 11. 
95 William J. Fenrick, The Prosecution of International Crimes in Relation to the Conduct of Military 
Operations, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 
501–505 (Terry Gill & Dieter Fleck eds., 2010). 
96 See, e.g., Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention (II) for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed 
Forces at Sea, art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention (III) Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 129, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention (IV) 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]; Additional Protocol I, supra note 25, 
arts. 86–87; Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention, art. 28, May 14, 
1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240; Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the 
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It is hopefully improbable that an autonomous weapon system 
would be programmed to commit war crimes. Much more likely would be a 
case in which a system that has not been so programmed is nevertheless 
used in a manner that constitutes such crimes. For example, the operator of 
an autonomous weapon system that cannot distinguish civilians from 
combatants who employs the system in an area where the two are 
intermixed has committed the war crime of indiscriminate attack. Any 
commander or supervisor who ordered the attack would likewise be 
criminally responsible for committing a war crime. So too would a 
commander or supervisor who knew the operation was about to be 
mounted and failed to suppress it or who later learned of the operation and 
failed to take action to hold those responsible accountable. 
 
The United States accepts the premise that those involved in 
autonomous weapon system operations may be held accountable for their 
decisions. In its most recent guidance on the use of the systems, the 
Department of Defense has emphasized that “[p]ersons who authorize the 
use of, direct the use of, or operate autonomous and semi-autonomous 
weapon systems must do so with appropriate care and in accordance with 
the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and 
applicable rules of engagement (ROE).”97 The policy imposes identical 
requirements on Commanders of the U.S. Combatant Commands.98 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, art. 15(2), Mar. 26, 1999, 
2253 U.N.T.S. 212; Rome Statute, supra note 6, arts. 25(3)(b), 28; Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, (as amended on May 17, 
2002), art. 7(1), S.C. Res. 827 annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 6(1), S.C. Res. 955 annex, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/955, (Nov. 8, 1994); Prosecutor v. Blaški , Case. No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Chamber 
Judgment, ¶¶ 281–282 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000); 
Prosecutor v. Krsti , Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 605 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001); Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, ¶223,Case No. 
ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment  (May 21, 1999); COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 6, ¶ 
6.1.3. 
97  DoD DIRECTIVE 3000.09, supra note 9, ¶. 4b. 
98 Id., encl. 4, ¶ 10b. The United States has nine Combatant Commands: U.S. Africa 
Command (USAFRICOM); U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM); U.S. European 
Command (USEUCOM); U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM); U.S. Pacific 
Command (USPACOM); U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM); U.S. 
Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM); U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM); 
U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).  
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Conclusion 
 
This Article has demonstrated that autonomous weapon systems are 
not unlawful per se. Their autonomy has no direct bearing on the probability 
they would cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury, does not 
preclude them from being directed at combatants and military objectives, 
and need not result in their having effects that an attacker cannot control. 
Individual systems could be developed that would violate these norms, but 
autonomous weapon systems are not prohibited on this basis as a category.  
 
International humanitarian law’s restrictions on the use of weapons 
would nevertheless limit their employment in certain circumstances. This is 
true of every weapon, from a rock to a rocket. Of course, the fact that 
autonomous weapon systems locate and attack persons and objects without 
human interaction raises unique issues. These challenges are not grounds 
for banning the systems entirely. On the contrary, international 
humanitarian law’s restrictions on the use of weapons (particularly the 
requirements that they be directed only against combatants and military 
objectives, they not be employed indiscriminately, their use not result in 
excessive harm to civilians or civilian objects, and they not be used when 
other available weapons could achieve a similar military advantage while 
placing civilians and civilian objects at less risk) are sufficiently robust to 
safeguard humanitarian values during the use of autonomous weapon 
systems. 
 
But might States ban the weapons in the foreseeable future? As 
noted in the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, international humanitarian 
law fixes “the technical limits at which the necessities of war ought to yield 
to the requirements of humanity.”99 Virtually every rule therein reflects a 
balance States have made between these two seminal 
factors⎯humanitarian concerns and military necessity. The humanitarian 
concerns that are factored into the equation reflect the interest States have 
in maximizing international humanitarian law’s protection of their 
combatants and civilian population during armed conflict. In that States are 
self-interested entities, these concerns are tempered by their desire to retain 
the ability to fight effectively in order to achieve national interests. The 
result of this dialectic interplay is international humanitarian law, either in 
the form of treaty law that has been negotiated by States on the basis of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 24. 
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their assessment of the balance or customary law resulting from State 
practice and opinio juris that reflects the balancing. 
 
Given this process of norm formulation, the Human Rights Watch 
position is unlikely to find traction. Clearly, and as illustrated in the new 
Department of Defense directive on autonomous weapon systems, States are 
sensitive to the humanitarian implications of these systems. Yet, autonomy 
in combat is in its infancy. Until both their potential for unintended human 
consequences and their combat potential are better understood, it is unlikely 
that any State would seriously consider banning autonomous weapon 
systems. Indeed, there is little historical precedent for banning weaponry 
before it has been fielded.100  
 
Counterintuitive though it may seem, it would arguably be 
irresponsible to prohibit autonomous weapons at this stage in their 
development. As noted, such weapons may offer the possibility of attacking 
the enemy with little risk to the attacker. Although this “value” has 
sometimes been criticized with respect to unmanned combat aerial systems 
like the Predator, there is no basis in international humanitarian law for 
suggesting that attacking forces must assume risk. On the contrary, what is 
often forgotten is that international humanitarian law affirmatively protects 
combatants. The paradigmatic example is the “cardinal” prohibition on 
weapons that cause unnecessary suffering.101 In fact, international 
humanitarian law was almost exclusively concerned with the protection of 
combatants until adoption of the fourth Geneva Convention in 1949.102 It 
runs counter to the object and purpose of this body of law to suggest that a 
weapon system that reduces harm to combatants in situations in which its 
use does not aggravate civilian risk should be unlawful. 
 
An even more compelling argument is that banning autonomous 
weapon systems before their potential is understood may have the effect of 
denying commanders a tool for minimizing the risk to civilians and civilian 
objects in certain attack scenarios. Admittedly, autonomous weapon system 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 The only contemporary exception is the ban on permanently blinding lasers, one that 
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Weapons (to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have 
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development is not at the point where one can authoritatively conclude the 
systems will offer less harmful options than human-operated systems. 
However, it is equally not at the point where such a possibility can be ruled 
out.  
 
Human Rights Watch is to be commended for drawing attention to 
the issue of fully autonomous weapon systems. However, in the absence of 
even a single such system being fielded, it is premature to draw conclusions 
either as to their legality or to the broader issue of whether they should be 
banned as a matter of policy. Understanding of the systems’ potential for 
both positive and negative ends is simply too primitive at this time to 
comfortably draw conclusions as to their legal, moral, and operational costs 
and benefits. 
 
